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lously enforced the principle that a public
officer may not make a contract in his official capacity in which he is personally
interested. (124 M. 761.) Such contracts
entered into by officials in their individual
capacity are against public policy.
In Ryszka vs. Board of Education (126
Misc. 622) a member of the school board
in the city of Lackawanna sold his services
indirectly to the school board in repairing
and repainting the school house. Judge
Harris says concerning such a contract:
"In my opinion the arrangement made in
reference to the employment of Bromley
(member of school board) was one that
should not have been made, as it violated
the law that a public servant while in the
discharge of his public duty may not assume a private duty in conflict with his
duty to the public. And if this were an
action on the contract for payment of the
contract price I would feel compelled to
dismiss the complaint." However, this was
not the issue and is only dicta here.
In Heughes vs. -Board of Education (37
A. D. 180) Young, a member of the school
board of the city of Rochester, indirectly
entered into.a contract with the defendant
to furnish a number of iron gates for a
public school in said city. A similar provision to Sec. 1868 of the Penal Law was
contained in the charter of the city of
Rochester. After citing this and Sec. 1868
of ihe Penal Law, the court in holding such
contract was an unlawful act interpreted
such provisions as being "manifestly for
the protection of the public and to relieve
persons who occupy positions of public
trust from any temptation to encourage by
their official action and expenditure of
public moneys in an extravagant, wasteful
and unnecessary manner in order that some
profit may thereby accrue to themselves as
individuals. It is consequently a provision
which is founded upon principles of public
policy, and one which the courts should enforce with the greatest rigor without regard io the effects of its enforcement upon
individual suitors."
In construing the last part of Sec. 1868
of the Penal Law relative to audit or approval by the commissioner of education
an opinion of the Attorney General in
1914 holds in substance that a trustee of a
State Normal School who is interested in
contracts to furnish services and supplies
to the school does not violate this section
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where his bill is subject to audit by the
commissioner of education.
There are any number of cases in which
a member of the board of supervisors in
his individual capacity cannot sell goods to
the board. By analgous reasoning this rule
might also apply to a member of the school
board.
A typical case is People ex rel Schenectady. Illuminating Co. vs. Board Supervisors. 166 A. D. 758, affirming 88 Misc.
226. Here one Carr who is a member of
the board of supervisors is also a stockholder, secretary and treurer of the
Schenectady Illuminating Co. The defendant corporation sold Mazda lamps at
the fair market value of $7.44 to the supervisors. No fraud is charged. The court
here sets aside the contract as void but
does not find Carr guilty of a misdemeanor
Sec. 1868 of the Penal Law, on the grounds

that
"A law, which existed bofore the statute
existed, forbade the contract. A principle,
if not a statute, has been violated in this
instance."

See also:
Matter of Plattsburg Pub. Co. vs. Looby
124 M. 761.
Beebe vs. Supervisors of Sullivan Co.
64 Hun. 277.
In Matter of Contracts made by Town
Officers, 32 St. Reports 471.
People vs. Stoll 243 N. Y. 453.
Matter of Lane, 34 St. Reports 552.

RECENT CASES OF INTEREST
CIVIL RIGHTS
Gambino vs. United States,

72 L. ed (139)
New York state troopers, without warrant, searched Gambino's automobile (while
it was occupied by Gambino) and found
and seized intoxicating liquor. Held for
violation of the National Prohibition Act,
the defendants moved for suppression of
the liquor as evidence, asserting the search
to be in violation of the 4th, 5th and 6th

Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
It was decided that although the troopers
were not agents of the United States, their
relation to the Federal prosecution was
such as to require the exclusion of the
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evidence wrongfully obtained. The circumstance that from the decision appeared
controlling was that New York State had
no prohibition act and the troopers were
acting solely in prosecution of the Federal
offense. The result, it seems, would have
been otherwise if New York had not repealed its enforcement act. The distinction, although convenient, is somewhat
artificial.

Evidence-Res Gestae--ill vs. Erie
R. Co.-A. D.-224 N. Y. S. 640.
Plaintiff's intestate was shot in defendant's freight yard. In response to call the
ambulance and chaplain of the Emergency
Hospital were at the freight yard five
minutes after the call was received. A
detective of defendant approached the ambulance and guided the chaplain to the
injured boy who was obviously in great
pain and the chaplain was permitted to
testify over objection and exception that
the boy then said to the detective, "What
did you shoot me for? I didn't do nothing."
Judge Crouch writing for the majority
of the court sets forth at great length that
various periods of time might have elapsed
after the shooting; and the statement, concerning which there is no evidence that
"the boy's will during a very considerable
interval was not dormant, was therefore
narrative." Presiding Judge Hubbs and
Judge Sears dissent.

HUSBAND AND WIFE - ACTION
FOR PERSONAL INJURY
Allen vs. Allen, 246 N. Y. (Adv.)
The question arose whether an action by
a wife against her husband for malicious
prosecution could be maintained under
Section 57 of the Domestic Relations Law.
Five Judges voted without opinion that
such an action could not be maintained
and that the rule imposed in Schultz vs.
Schultz (89 N. Y. 644), also without
opinion, remains unchanged.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Pound,
in which Judge Andrews concurred, is an
interesting and spirited assumption of "the
gallant duty of setting the law free to
redress, by civil actions, all the domestic
disputes of husband and wife."
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A most vigorous and persuasive portion
of Judge Pound's opinion is that in which
he discusses the stare decisis rule: "We
are now . . . enjoined to defer to cases
already adjudicated. The law is said to
be established by the express decision of
this Court that the action cannot be main,
tained. This argument, if applicable, is
weighty but* not conclusive . . . When
time makes ancient rules of personal rights
and remedies uncouth, illogical and pro,
ductive of harm, they need not be inexorably insisted upon. Better protection
may be given to such rights in the future."
The Schultz vs. Schultz case had under
consideration a provision of the Married
Women's Act of 1860 which was repealed
in 1880, while the Allen vs. Allen case
arose under a law passed in 1890, now
Section 57 of the Domestic Relations Law.
"The Court is thus set free to examine the
question not primarily by the silence of the
majority in the Schultz case, the lapse of
time and the conflict of authority . . .
but by the subsequent change in the language of the statutes, which requires a new
consideration of the factors that determine
the present legislative intent."
There is much force in Judge Pound's
declaration that "consistency would seem
to dictate that with the wide grant of a
legal entity to the wife" (conferred by
Section 57 of the Domestic Relations Law)
"the legislature should have excluded her
right of action against her husband by clear
words." It would have been easy for the
Legislature to have made an exception if
it had intended one. A husband may not
"lawfully beat his wife, maliciously injure
her reputation or prosecute her criminally
to gratify his malice." When then should
the wife be denied a remedy by the "exaggerated influence of an outgrown fiction"
that husband and wife are one?
The discussion of the language of the
statutes referred to in the opinion of Judge
Pound is somewhat general but it would
seem that the Court of Appeals might have
.voted with Judges Pound and Andrews in
this matter, especially since the case on
which they had otherwise to rest, Schultz
vs. Schultz, supra, was one in which the
Court had without opinion by a divided
vote reversed an Appellate Division finding.
To the Legislature now is left the "gallant
duty."

